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ADRIÁN SCRIBANO

Sociology of Bodies/Emotions: The Perspective of Karl Marx¹

Introduction

Marx is an author who lived intensely his present and he was concerned about understanding the past and gaining a glimpse of the future. He is a researcher who is open and sensitive to the developments of all the sciences of his time, who spares no effort to go from Bible quotes and academic reports to using the key writers of what we usually call the “Occident”. In his works he “uses” the classics of economics – Ricardo, Malthus, and Smith – the various expressions of the philosophy of his time, such as Hegel or Feuerbach, and great writers such as Dante, Goethe and Shakespeare, all put at the service of a most basic goal: understanding the process of transformation.

It is in this context that the present work aims to make evident the existence of a sociology of bodies and emotions in the work of Karl Marx. Given that this idea is resisted by some “Marxists”, it has been preferred here to follow the structure of the first chapter of my book² dedicated to deriving from the texts of the author the features of the aforementioned sociology. In this sense, that first chapter makes use of the *Philosophical and Economic Manuscripts* of 1844 to systematize the elementary characteristics of Marx’s view of emotions.

1. Il seguente articolo non è stato sottoposto al consueto processo di referaggio. Direzione e Redazione della rivista si sono assunte la responsabilità scientifica della sua pubblicazione.

2. Scribano, A. (2016)

Both in the chapter mentioned and in the current presentation I have preferred to make extensive use of quotations in order to persuade the reader about the correctness of my interpretation. Since the hermeneutics carried out was originally performed in Spanish, I prefer to quote both an edition in Spanish and one in English that accompanies the translation of that interpretation.

As I have already expressed, the aim of this paper is to show the possibility of finding in Marx's writings clear indications for the construction of a sociology of bodies and emotions. Several strategies can be proposed for doing this: in this paper I chose a close reading and interpretation of the *1844 Manuscripts* as a textual corpus which allows us to underpin one among many possible systematizations.

In order to reach this systematization, we have selected the following argumentative strategies: a) we start by reviewing and summarizing the basic conceptual elements of the *Manuscripts* which allow us to reconstruct Marx's sociology of bodies and emotions and, b) we conclude by presenting three successive approaches to the objective of this paper.

Three very important aspects of Marx's perspective dealing with the connections between senses, sensations, and emotions are not included in this interpretation: alienation, fetishism, and the religiosity of capitalism. These concepts are left out, not only due to the limited scope of this paper, but more importantly because our interest here is to show the basic features of the possibility of finding in Marx's work the general guidelines for the construction of a sociology of bodies and emotions.

More than a century and a half ago, Karl Marx perceived that capitalism is based on the commodification of desire "in-and-through" the use of "others" as an object of our enjoyment. He saw clearly: a) that the senses (hearing, tasting, touching, seeing, smelling, etc.) were a battlefield for capitalist exploitation, b) that sensibilities, from greed to waste, were the pillars of the political economy of morality, c) that the emotions of anger, joy, and contempt were inscribed in the material conditions of existence, and d) that the constitution of the bodies, from their nutrition to their gratification, was an essential part of the capitalist system.

There are several motives underpinning our claim that it is possible to construct such a sociology, but they can be boiled down to the following thematic axes that should, according to our perspective, be part of any sociology of bodies/

emotions. Any such sociology should: 1. provide an answer to the question about the relation between emotions and bodies; 2. establish the natural/constructed character of emotional “phenomena”; 3. provide for the analysis of the connections between bodies, emotions, and the structuring of society, and; 4. at least preliminarily, identify the results of those connections in terms of which the “prevailing” emotions for a given society are configured.

As we will attempt to show here, these four axes can be explicitly found in Marx’s *1844 Manuscripts*, although their traces in the rest of Marx’s writings is left for future research.

1. Sociology of Bodies and Emotions in the 1844 Manuscripts

The presentation strategy for our argumentation has been, in the first instance, to systematize some of the central features found in the text by making ample use of footnotes as hermeneutic “guarantees”. For our second approach we transfer paragraphs taken from the *Manuscripts*, some also extensive, in order to reveal the clear traces relevant for a sociology of bodies and emotions found in them.

1.1 First Approach: Cross-cutting Axes

In Marx writings in general, but especially in the *Manuscripts*, there is a special net of connections between corporality, emotionality, and sensations. This web is woven around three cross-cutting axes which are used by Marx throughout the text: the connections between needs³, practices, and senses; the relations between human activity, senses, and expropriation, and; the articulation between morality, political economy, and sensibilities.

3. Because of our limited aim in this paper, we cannot adequately discuss Marx’s ideas about needs. The main keys in order to do this, although on a divergent perspective on feelings and biology than the one used here, can be found in the classic book by Agnes Heller on the subject.

The first axis is related to the human body (which, however, can only be understood in the *plural* form – as human bodies – given the ontological co-constitution of human beings) as the bearer and creator of a helical structure which includes the instances of its physiological features, the individual/social history of its development, and the proximities/distances between needs/demands/desires⁴. In this sense, the biological aspects of bodies are the result of a set of inherited features (phylogenetically and ontogenetically constituted), shaped by the “humanization” of the sensations, a process understood as the result of the praxis (tasks, knowledge, and feelings) that configure the social. The absence/presence of nutrients, basic for the production and reproduction of bodies, interconnect, in their own overcoming as needs, with the dialectic between objects available to the subject that will provide them with their character of human senses, breaking the mere abstraction undelaying the connection of lack/satisfactions⁵. In this section of the moebian path between bodies and sensibilities of the senses (smell, taste, touch, sight, and sound⁶), these are appropriation and reproduction practices of the object/nature⁷, individual and social world. Thus, we here present a conceptual scheme of the relations between impressions, perceptions⁸, and senses fertilizing a materialistic approach to emotions, to which we will return later.

Through this second axis, it is possible to understand how Marx interweaves the history of the senses with human activity, which is transformed by capitalism in (and with) the process of struggle/conquest emerging from the expro-

4. (Marx, *Manuscritos: Economía y Filosofía*, 147)

5. (Ídem 149)

6. The several possible and problematic classifications of the senses as five or more and their denominations are not discussed here.

7. Because of the scope of this paper we do not discuss the complex theme of the existence of the idea of nature and of a second nature in Marx, however this is a good time to remind the reader of a seminal (and curious) study by Bauman (*Por uma sociologia crítica. Um ensaio sobre senso comum e emancipação*) which provides clues on the issue, although differing from our approach which stems from dialectical critical realism.

8. Relevant for this point are Sartre’s and Merleau-Ponty’s differing perspectives on the status of the relations between body and emotions, which time and again are recast by the current sociology of bodies and emotions

priation of life⁹. The path through which human activity transforms itself and transforms its “environment” as a world for itself and for future generations, becoming part of nature and humanizing it, is transformed under capitalism in the history of ex-propriations¹⁰ i.e., of ever-more explicit obturations to the flux of life that literalities embody the senses as practices. Expropriation involves an embodiment of systematic negations of life transformed into the basis of a system oriented towards death. The expropriation of energies is the first manifestation of a making-of-man as an image of capital, understood as accumulated labor: as sensible activity from which man is alienated from everything beyond the minimum necessary for vital reproduction¹¹. The expropriation of energies is the basis for a systematic regulation of feelings: life is pure factory discipline made flesh. The expropriation of energy “captures” the senses, configuring the sensibilities by breaking the appropriation in the relation to the world that man exercises every day. These networks of activity, senses and expropriation give rise to a reading of social sensibilities tied to a long historical process which takes *form* in the multiple ways of living the contingency and uncertainty which we humans deal with in the process of unilateral and differential appropriation of our capacities¹².

The third reading axis of Marx’s writings which we propose here, gives rise to a critical hermeneutics about the constitution of social fantasies and phantoms as social operators of enjoyment, pleasure, and passion, as structuring the bearability of order and its breakdown¹³. This brings to the fore a sociology of bodies and emotions that has as its privileged analytical object a political economy of morality for the understanding of the flux of acceptance, naturalization and incorporation of the real as an “always-there” from which escaping is always the impossible aim¹⁴. Enjoyment, as a possible condition of the human senses,

9. As already noted above, we do not deal here with Marx’s theory of alienation. However, we recommend the well-known essays by Mészáros on the subject as parallel readings to this paper.

10. (Ídem 151)

11. (Ídem 54)

12. (Ídem 67)

13. It is worthwhile noting here the multiple suggestions for this found in the disparate and contradictory discourses of Marcuse and Fromm on this issue.

14. (Ídem 87)

is a permanent and continuous part of a life constructed in the vertices that add having to the substratum of my enjoyment¹⁵. The moral dialectics between asceticism, renunciation and abstention, and luxury, waste, and abandonment, are the elementary norms that make saving and consumption the features of life itself under capitalism. The locus of pleasures as merchandize, and as engines of commodification of life as practices (saving/consumption), which take on the status of moral norms meant to build “categories” of perceptions, takes us back to the first axis analyzed here. Thus understood, bodies, emotions and society are no more than open transparent transmission bands for the conduction of political economy’s pornography¹⁶.

By returning to the interactions between these three axes, we can retrace a path marked by several milestones which will guide us to the solid foundations of a sociology of emotions and bodies. In order to approach these milestones, and thus reconstruct the foundations, we now turn to a series of commentaries on the *Manuscripts* which make this task possible.

1.2 Foundational Texts for a Sociology of Bodies and Emotions

“To say that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being with natural powers means that he has real, sensuous objects as the object of his being and of his vital expression, or that he can only express his life in real, sensuous objects.” (Marx, *Manuscripts*, 102, our emphasis)

For Marx sensations are “ontological affirmation”, meaning that we are woven by them as human beings. For him, we humans are a moment in the overcoming of “nature” in the sense that we can reconstruct the relation between need and existence, we are living beings so far as we are sentient beings. There is a direct connection between feelings, existence, and life as an assertion unique to the subject. Society produces sensations and sensations produce society. Sensations are a set of practices that make present human dispositions. The object/s is/are such as long as it claims, and “makes present”, the links between sensations, needs,

15. (Ídem 145)

16. (Ídem 159)

and existence. We exist as makers of objects, understood as aims of needs and processes of appropriation of the real. The objects of his impulses exist “outside” man; Marx unites in this sense impulses/objects/sensibilities as milestones of existence. This is the framework that allows for the understanding of the sensible as the real of the human; the real is what is impassioned, in the sense of tendency and energy.

In his “definition of man” Marx includes enjoyment as a constitutive feature of social existence, in his perspective there is a direct connection between naturalism and enjoyment, and also of the “place” of enjoyment as structurer of the human real in praxis. Thus, sociability and enjoyment become directly connected. This is the enjoyment of objects by human sensibility which puts into play passions as energies in movement towards the making of societies. Passion is the source of activity and an explosion of energy of man.

Activity as self-assertion of man connects passions and the appropriation of the “natural” and inter-subjectivity, with the co-presence of corporality in the social. Sensibility transforms man into human as a process of assertion of the human content in the objects he makes for himself as external and acting specification. “Consciousness” (knowing, doing, and feeling) of man takes as its starting point and “pre-tended” life as objective reality. If social being determines consciousness, then there is an essential connection between the latter and the forms of sensibility constructed by man.

In this transit it is understood that: the other, as a medium of my enjoyment, connects me with the generalizing force of the Other as installer of Enjoyment. In this context enjoyment is an assertion of existence of the objects as mediators of human sensations.

This is why the mystification of capital is linked to the force of money in the replacement of the ontological qualities of man. What the heart yearns for is inoculated in the *use* of the other as a mean/instrument of my enjoyment through the objects, and the Object which may metamorphose into all objects: money.

This is the immediate enjoyment connected to having as mystification of the generic enjoyment as man. The distance and proximity enjoyment/abstinence become concrete in the social by the making present the relations of consumption, fantasies, and regulations of sensations. The regulation of needs and the

“joys” reveal themselves as the roots of the regulative mechanisms of sensations. Senses and needs are nullified, prohibited, and inhibited in the paradox of the morality of political economy. Thus we witness the emergence, in the capitalist structuration, of animal needs and animal-like senses, as a solidary pair constitutive of the refinement of needs, where hunger and the plenitude enjoyed by the bourgeoisie live together.

There is a morality of political economy, such that political economy in itself is a paradoxical morality located between ascetic saving and waste as the structure of an alienated life. Capitalism is a regime of fantasies and phantoms on man’s capacities to enact the senses. The mechanisms of social bearability are the central axis of capital’s structuration. It is in this context that social fantasies and phantoms reveal themselves as part of the tidy realm of political economy as expulsion and expropriation practices.

In this sense, the critique of political economy is both a critique of fetishism and alienation, and an epistemology of sciences, united in the analysis of the structuration and regulation of needs.

Given the connections between sensibilities and humanity, all sciences “begin” in the hermeneutics of the history of the senses. Naturalism is the basis for all the dialectics of the real, as the foundation of the humanization of multiple determinations of the concrete. Intersubjectivity is the condition for possibility of all sensibility and of the sensible nature of thinking and language. For a science with critical intention, thinking and language, as practices, constitute the path from senses to sensibilities.

In order to illustrate these claims, we now turn to a series of fragments ordered according to the following categories: a) perspective on man and humanity; senses, individuality, and collectivity; b) the locus of “anthropological qualities” in social structuring; c) Enjoyment and Passion, and d) the centrality of sensations as a node for the understanding of the world.

1.2 a. *Perspective on Man and Humanity: Senses, Individuality, and Collectivity*¹⁷

1. “Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being, and as a living natural being, he is on the one hand equipped with natural powers, with vital powers, he is an active natural being; these powers exist in him as dispositions and capacities, as drives. On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being, he is a suffering, conditioned, and limited being, like animals and plants. that is to say, the objects of his drives exist outside him as objects independent of him; but these objects are objects of his need, essential objects, indispensable to the exercise and confirmation of his essential powers.” (Marx, *Manuscripts*, 102, our emphasis)
2. “If man’s feelings, passions, etc., are not merely anthropological phenomena in the (narrower) sense, but truly ontological affirmation of being (of nature), and if they are only really affirmed because their object exists for them as a sensual object, then it is clear that:
 1. They have by no means merely one mode of affirmation, but rather that the distinct character of their existence, of their life, is constituted by the distinct mode of their affirmation. In what manner the object exists for them, is the characteristic mode of their gratification.
 2. Wherever the sensuous affirmation is the direct annulment of the object in its independent form (as in eating, drinking, working up of the object, etc.), this is the affirmation of the object.
 3. Insofar as man, and hence also his feeling, etc., is human, the affirmation of the object by another is likewise his own gratification.
 4. Only through developed industry – i.e., through the medium of private property – does the ontological essence of human passion come into

17. To confront other aspects of this dimension, see in the quoted Spanish edition of the *Manuscripts* pages 176, 151, 147, 194 y 112

being, in its totality as well as in its humanity; the science of man is therefore itself a product of man's own practical activity.

5. The meaning of private property apart from its estrangement – is the existence of essential objects for man, both as objects of enjoyment and as objects of activity". (Marx, *Manuscripts*, 128, our emphasis)

1.2. b. *The Locus of "Anthropologic Qualities" in Social Structuring*¹⁸

3. "Just as private property is only the sensuous expression of the fact that man becomes objective for himself and at the same time becomes an alien and inhuman object for himself, that his expression of life [Lebensausserung] is his alienation of life [Lebensentausserung], and that his realization is a loss of reality, an alien reality, so the positive supersession of private property – i.e., the sensuous appropriation of the human essence and human life, of objective man and of human works by and for man – should not be understood only in the sense of direct, one-sided consumption, of possession, of having. Man appropriates his integral essence in an integral way, as a total man. All his human relations to the world – seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, contemplating, sensing, wanting, acting, loving – in short, all the organs of his individuality, like the organs which are directly communal in form, are in their objective approach or in their approach to the object the appropriation of that object. This appropriation of human reality, their approach to the object, is the confirmation of human reality. [Marx's note: It is therefore just as varied as the determinations of the human essence and activities.] It is human effectiveness and human suffering, for suffering, humanly conceived, is an enjoyment of the self for man." (Marx, *Manuscripts*, 77, our emphasis)

18. To confront other aspects of this dimension, see in the quoted Spanish edition of the *Manuscripts* pages 148, 61, 110 and 111

1.2 c. *Enjoyment and Passion*¹⁹

4. “A being which does not have its nature outside itself is not a natural being and plays no part in the system of nature. A being which has no object outside it, it would exist in a condition of solitude. For as soon as there are objects outside me, as soon as I am not alone, I am another, a reality other than the object outside me. For this third object I am therefore a reality other than it – i.e., its object. A being which is not the object of another being therefore presupposes that no objective being exists. As soon as I have an object, this object has me for its object. But a non-objective being is an unreal, non-sensuous, merely thought – i.e., merely conceived – being, a being of abstraction. To be sensuous – i.e., to be real – is to be an object of sense, a sensuous object, and thus to have sensuous objects outside oneself, objects of one’s sense perception. To be sensuous is to suffer (to be subjected to the actions of another).
5. Man as an objective sensuous being is therefore a suffering being, and because he feels his suffering [Leiden], he is a passionate [leidenschaftliches] being. Passion is man’s essential power vigorously striving to attain its object.” (Marx, Manuscripts, 102-103, our emphasis)
6. “There is a form of inactive, extravagant wealth given over wholly to pleasure, the enjoyer of which on the one hand behaves as a mere ephemeral individual frantically spending himself to no purpose, and also regards the slave-labour of others (human sweat and blood) as the prey of his cupidity. He therefore knows man himself, and hence also his own self, as a sacrificed and futile being. With such wealth contempt of man makes its appearance, partly as arrogance and as squandering of what can give sustenance to a hundred human lives, and partly as the infamous illusion that his own unbridled extravagance and ceaseless, unproductive consumption is the condition of the other’s labour and therefore of his subsistence. He

19. To confront other aspects of this dimension, see in the quoted Spanish edition of the *Manuscripts* pages 145, 153, 154 and 195

regards the realisation of the essential powers of man only as the realisation of his own excesses, his whims and capricious, bizarre notions. This wealth which, on the other hand, again knows wealth as a mere means, as something that is good for nothing but to be annihilated and which is therefore at once slave and master, at once magnanimous and base, capricious, presumptuous, conceited, refined, cultured and witty – this wealth has not yet experienced wealth as an utterly alien power over itself: it sees in it, rather, only its own power, and (not) a wealth but enjoyment (is its final) aim.” (Marx, *Manuscripts*, 124, our emphasis)

1.2 d. The centrality of sensations as a node for the understanding of the world²⁰

Sense perception (see Feuerbach) must be the basis of all science. Only when science starts out from sense perception in the dual form of sensuous consciousness and sensuous need – i.e., only when science starts out from nature – is it real science. The whole of history is a preparation, a development, for “man” to become the object of sensuous consciousness and for the needs of “man as man” to become [sensuous] needs. History itself is a real part of natural history and of nature’s becoming man. Natural science will, in time, subsume the science of man, just as the science of man will subsume natural science: there will be one science.

Man is the immediate object of natural science; for immediate sensuous nature for man is, immediately, human sense perception (an identical expression) in the form of the other man who is present in his sensuous immediacy for him. His own sense perception only exists as human sense perception for himself through the other man. But nature is the immediate object of the science of man. Man’s first object – man – is nature, sense perception; and the particular sensuous human powers, since they can find objective realization only in natural objects, can find self-knowledge only in the science of nature in general. The element of thought itself, the element of the vital expression of thought – language – is

20. To confront other aspects of this dimension, see in the quoted Spanish edition of the *Manuscripts* pages 151, 152 and 153

sensuous nature. The social reality of nature and human natural science or the natural science of man are identical expressions.” (Marx, *Manuscripts*, 79, our emphasis)

It is clear that from the same vision of subject, individuality and sensibility that we find in the *Manuscripts*, it is possible to identify the basic features to reconstruct Marx’s perspective on the interrelationships between bodies, emotions and society. To make this even more visible, we return to the conclusions we have drawn up to this point.

2. *An Ending for a New Beginning*

As we have been claiming in this paper, our main purpose has been to reveal the possibility for the construction of a sociology of the bodies and emotions, using Marx’s ideas as its starting point. To conclude, we state three approaches to what has been explored thus far, which from our perspective, provide the necessary argumentative guarantees for our initial proposal.

A first approach stems from the conceptual components found in the *Manuscripts*, and can be summarized as follows.

We find in the *Manuscripts* an idea of bodies and how these are made, together with the idea of the perception of those bodies. Therefore, there is a strong argument for the connection between senses, bodies and sociability, appealing to a social history of their interweaving and distances. The connection between senses and sociabilities in the relation between enjoyments and the configuration of objects and corporalities is also stated. The dialectic of co-constitution between the biological/physical and the social/human is also present; this provides a naturalistic/dialectical answer to the question about the primary/constituted character of sensations. The tensions between expropriated/alienated body, strengthened/stunted senses and sensibilities are given a fundamental role in capitalist structuring. In relation to this, the connections between human knowledge, sensibility and social practice are described, followed by a schematization of the central features of the existence of a political economy of morality. Human knowledge is claimed in the *Manuscripts* as the core activity of the humanization of the world,

making reference to passion as its basic movement. The processes of rejection and destitution of sensibilities as the axis of the processes of de-humanization are analyzed. A contingent and non-determinist perspective on the manifestation and specifications of bodies and emotions in the historical path is claimed. The cognitive-affective character of the interrelation between individuals, and the configuration of the social/individual and the individual/social is also proposed in this early text by Marx.

Thus, as claimed above, in his *Manuscripts*, Marx provides systematic statements about: 1. the relations between sensations and bodies; 2. the natural/constructed character of emotional “phenomena”; 3. the analysis of the connections between bodies, emotions, and the structuring of society, and; 4. the identification of the results of said connections in terms of pointing to the “prevailing” emotions in a given society.

A second approach is worthwhile considering as support for the existence of clear guidelines for the construction of a sociology of bodies and emotions: the presence in the *Manuscripts* of conceptualizations, and/or theoretical approaches to the basic themes/concepts of such a sociology.

a) Senses, Sensations, and Sensibilities

In the texts quoted here we find a conceptualization of emotions based on senses, emotions here understood as related to ideas of force, impulse, energy, and movement. Such as is claimed by Ahmed:

The word ‘emotion’ comes from Latin, *emovere*, referring to ‘to move, to move out’. So emotions are what move us. But emotions are also about attachments, about what connects us to this or that. The relationship between movement and attachment is instructive. What moves us, what makes us feel, is also that which holds us in place, or gives us a dwelling place. Emotion may function as a ‘contingent attachment’ to the world (see Sartre, 1996: 333, emphasis mine). The word ‘contingency’ has the same root in Latin as the word ‘contact’ (Latin: *contingere*: com-, with; *tangere*, to touch). Contingency is linked then to proximity, to getting close enough to touch another and to be moved by another. So what attaches us, what connects us to this or that place, or to this or that other, such that we cannot stay removed from this other, is also what moves us, or what affects us such that we are no longer in the same place. (Ahmed 23, highlight ours)

Indeed, the qualities of force in movement and the potentiality of approach in situations of co-presence are those to which Marx attributes human sensibilities as emotions:

In the same way, and for the same reasons, the senses of social man are different from those of non-social man. Only through the objectively unfolded wealth of human nature can the wealth of subjective human sensitivity – a musical ear, an eye for the beauty of form, in short, senses capable of human gratification – be either cultivated or created. For not only the five senses, but also the so-called spiritual senses, the practical senses (will, love, etc.), in a word, the human sense, the humanity of the senses – all these come into being only through the existence of their objects, through humanized nature. The cultivation of the five senses is the work of all previous history. Sense which is a prisoner of crude practical need has only a restricted sense. For a man who is starving, the human form of food does not exist, only its abstract form exists; it could just as well be present in its crudest form, and it would be hard to say how this way of eating differs from that of animals (Marx, *Manuscripts*, 78)

b) Materiality of the Body and Body of Sensibility

As we have claimed above, for Marx there is no body/emotion dichotomy, neither is there a thinking/being dichotomy, this brings him close to the logic of what is today called *embodiment*, or society made body; it also establishes a conjunction/separation between bodies/senses/sociabilities as the basis for his explanation of subjectivity:

Whenever real, corporeal man, man with his feet firmly on the solid ground, man exhaling and inhaling all the forces of nature, posits his real, objective essential powers as alien objects by his externalisation, it is not the act of positing which is the subject in this process: it is the subjectivity of objective essential powers, whose action, therefore, must also be something objective. (Marx, *Manuscripts*, 138)

The subject is an embodied being as the result of a history of construction as sociability, as the development of human senses and enjoyment.

c) Passion/Enjoyment and Impotence/Pain

The paradoxical structure of the political economy of morality taken as practices, which generates the imperative for the interactional categories of humans, is complex, but also (fundamentally), ruptured by passion as a basic emotion and locus of the battle of capitalist expropriation.

This passion is “opposed” to impotence, as we already mentioned above, and Scheff has recognized that:

In his early work, Marx made casual but brilliant remarks about emotions. For example, he named the emotions that accompany alienation (disconnect): feelings of “impotence” (shame) and “indignation” (anger) (Tucker 1978, pp. 133- 134). In a letter to Ruge in 1843 about German nationalism, he wrote: “...if a whole nation were to feel ashamed it would be like a lion recoiling in order to spring.” This latter statement, particularly, turned out to be prophetic of the fate of France, then Germany in the period 1871-1945 (Scheff 1994). (Scheff “Social-emotional world”, 350)

But, as we also already mentioned, for Marx “...passion is man’s essential power vigorously striving to attain its object” (Marx, *Manuscripts*, 103), and this passion is what is limited and “overcome” in alienation:

Firstly, the fact that labor is external to the worker – i.e., does not belong to his essential being; that he, therefore, does not confirm himself in his work, but denies himself, feels miserable and not happy, does not develop free mental and physical energy, but mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind. Hence, the worker feels himself only when he is not working; when he is working, he does not feel himself. He is at home when he is not working, and not at home when he is working. His labor is, therefore, not voluntary but forced, it is forced labor. It is, therefore, not the satisfaction of a need but a mere means to satisfy needs outside itself. Its alien character is clearly demonstrated by the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, it is shunned like the plague. External labor, labor in which man alienates himself, is a labor of self-sacrifice, of mortification. Finally, the external character of labor for the worker is demonstrated by the fact that it belongs not to him but to another, and that in it he belongs not to himself but to another. Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of the human imagination, the human brain, and the human heart, detaches itself from the individual and reappears as the alien activity of a god or of a devil, so the activity of the worker is not his own spontaneous activity. It belongs to another, it is a loss of his self. (Marx, *Manuscripts*, 51)

For Marx, the senses (including “spiritual senses”) – their origin and development (and/or reduction) as capacities and dispositions of the subject inscribed in historical modifications of those senses and the human sensibilities, understood as the result of enjoyment as an activity facing their necessities as embodied beings and “moved” by passion as fundamental energy – are the key to the understanding of the whole edifice of the political economy of morality, and therefore society. In other words, they are a key to the understanding of the ways in which bodies, emotions, and society are connected.

A third approach that highlights the relevance of Marx’s ideas to the aims of this paper, is the epistemic rupture of the aporetic presentations of today’s sociology of bodies and emotions made possible by his perspective. In other words, we find in the 1844 Manuscripts, as in the rest of Marx’s writings, arguments in favor of an analysis of the connections between bodies, emotions and society that breach some of the central axes of the different models/perspectives of the “discipline” as irreconcilable perspectives.

According to Hochschild²¹, in the last century we witness the emergence of two great models for the study of emotions: the organic model (Darwin, James, Freud); and the interactional model (Dewey, Mills, Goffman). The first considers emotions basically as a biological process, whereas the second emphasizes them as a process of “gestation” and creations between subjects.

Similarly Kemper has argued for the breaking of dichotomies and claimed that: “In general, social constructionists hold that there is great plasticity to human emotions because emotions are largely disconnected from biology” (“Social Constructionist and Positivist Approaches to the Sociology of Emotions Source”, 337) and that; “The positivist approach, on the other hand, maintains an important link with biology and the physiological concomitants of emotion...” (Kemper, *Ídem*, 337)

21. Hochschild, A. R., *The Managed Heart. Commercialization on Human Feeling* (Twentieth Anniversary Edition, 2003).

For the purposes of identifying Marx's contribution to this field we have constructed²² five models/perspectives:

- a. *Macro or Micro*: This dichotomy privileges the individual/subjective or the collective/social as the “space” and source of emotions.
- b. *Management or “Significance”*: The differences come about by understanding emotions as “experiential” processes managed by the subjects or as processes that mark/signify the experiences of the subjects.
- c. *Constructed or Biological*: One side emphasizes the physiological/organic character of emotions (and bodies), and the other the fact that they are the result of the processes of construction by individuals.
- d. *Basic Emotions or Emotions “as evaluations”*: The distance is established by either highlighting the existence of fundamental (anger, fear, happiness) emotions (linked to corporal reactions) or understanding emotions as the product of the subjects' appreciations of their surroundings.
- e. *Social Constructionist or Social Interactionist*: Interactionists claim that emotions “pass” through the processes of inter-relation between subjects, whereas constructionists uphold that emotions have a high cognitive content and are socially “elaborated” by individuals.

22. The construction of these models/perspectives is based on: Gross y Feldman Barrett (“Emotion Generation and Emotion Regulation”); Smith y Schenider (“Critiquing Models of Emotions”), Hochsild (*The Managed Heart*) and Kemper (“Social Constructionist”).

Chart 1 – Marx’s rupture of the classification criteria of contemporary perspectives

Models/ Perspectives	Marx’s Perspective in the Manuscripts
Macro or Micro	The definition of the senses as resulting from human existence and regulated by the political economy of morality dissolves the pair individual/society as an aporia.
Management or “Significance”	The connections between having the other as an object of enjoyment and the substitutions of material/sensible potentialities in, and through, money are a clear rupture of this pair.
Constructed or Biological	The fact that the formation of the five senses is the result of the eternal historical process deconstructs the aporetic situation between social and physiological construction as an explanation of sensations and emotions.
Basic Emotions or Emotions “as evaluations”	The statement on the relations between objects, needs, and human senses overruns this “epistemological pair”
Social Constructionist or Social Interactionist	The analyses of the constitution of the political economy of morality as “linking” practices of expropriation turned into moral imperatives breaches the aporia of these perspectives

Source: Own elaboration.

It becomes clear in the previous chart how Marx’s ideas as presented here, not only establish a set of clear guidelines for the construction of a sociology of bodies and emotions, but are also an important epistemic contribution to such a construction.

As suggested in this paper, these guidelines can be found, not only in the *Manuscripts*, but also in Marx’s *Doctoral Dissertation*, which explores the connections between bodies, sensations, and constitutions of the real and perceptions of the world and time, in *Capital*, where a more “productive” approach to fetishisms is proposed, and in the *Grundrisse*, in which the theory of alienation is “completed”.

Furthermore, the texts analyzed here, and the whole of Marx's work, from our perspective, provides a clear argument for understanding that the sociology of bodies and emotions casts a critical eye over the social. Such a critical eye, looking at society slantwise, finds in the connections between impression, perceptions, sensations, and emotions a key for the understanding of the dome of the structure of capital, and reveals the constructions of social fantasies and phantoms as one of the most important tasks of the capitalist system today.

A final jest should distend the tension between the central claims made in this paper, and the sceptic who rejects it: it has the tail of a lion, the mane of a lion, and roars like a lion; *Marx established the main milestones of a sociology of bodies and emotion as a social critique.*

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